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Voting (Insincerely) in Corporate Law
Zohar Goshen*

Voting lies at the center of collective decision-making in corporate
law. While scholars have identified various problems with the voting
mechanism, insincere voting—in the forms of strategic voting and
conflict of interests voting—is perhaps the most fundamental. This
article shows that insincere voting distorts the voting mechanism at
its core, undermining its ability to determine transaction efficiency.
As further demonstrated, strategic and conflict of interests problems
frequently coincide with one another: voting strategically often means
being in conflict, and many fact patterns present aspects of both
problems. Finally, this article claims that although the two problems
have seemingly different solutions, these solutions are essentially
similar in nature: all solutions to insincere voting are variations on
two basic rules, namely, property rules and liability rules.

INTRODUCTION

Voting is the most commonly accepted method for extracting the "group
preference" from among the disparate and diverging subjective opinions
of a corporation’s security holders. Nonetheless, the proper functioning of
the voting mechanism is often endangered due to insincere voting. The
mechanism cannot operate properly unless every security holder votes
sincerely, that is, in accordance with his or her personal belief regarding the
value of the transaction to the corporation as a whole.1 Underlying the voting
mechanism is a statistical proposition that a majority vote for a corporate
transaction represents the "correct" choice.2 If the majority of security holders
*
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Law School. I thank Omri Yadlin for his valuable comments and Rhoda Pagano for
her invaluable help in writing this article.
Kenneth Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (2d ed. 1963).
"Correct" means the choice that will maximize the group’s expected return from the
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believe that a particular transaction is efficient, it probably is. However, when
security holders cast their ballots in accordance with the way other security
holders are going to vote ("strategic voting") or in line with their own personal
interests in a deal ("conflict of interests voting"), this statistical proposition
collapses. Such insincere voting undermines the voting mechanism itself and,
along with it, the ability to distinguish efficient transactions from inefficient
ones.
This article explores both types of insincere voting—strategic voting
and conflict of interests voting—as well as the solutions that are available
to contend with this phenomenon. Part I reviews the nature of these two
types of voting, presenting the contexts in which they tend to arise. Part II
demonstrates that strategic problems and conflict of interests problems are
fraternal twins: strategic voting can also be construed as conflict of interests
voting, and many fact patterns present aspects of both problems. Finally,
Part III argues that there are two possible solutions to both problems. The
first, property-rule protection, which validates only consensual transactions,
affords ex ante protection to minority security holders against pressure
to enter into a deal. The second, liability-rule protection, affords ex post
protection to the voter, allowing the transaction to take place without the
consent of the minority, but affording that minority the right to adequate
compensation.3

I. THE VOTING MECHANISM AND INSINCERE VOTING
One of the primary objectives of corporate law is to facilitate efficient
transactions and to prevent inefficient deals from taking place. In market
economies, efficiency is achieved when assets are transferred from those
who value them less to those who value them more.4 Because the typical actor
in the market wants to increase the value of her holdings, the consent of both
parties to a transaction serves as an approximate indicator of its efficiency.5
Suppose, for example, that A owns a piece of property that she values at

3
4
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decision. See Shmuel I. Nitzan & Uriel Procaccia, Optimal Voting Procedures for
Profit Maximizing Firms, 51 Pub. Choice 191 (1986).
See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972).
Efficient in the sense of Pareto-efficiency: a transaction that improves the situation
of at least one of the parties without harming anyone. Richard Posner, Economic
Analysis of the Law 13 (4th ed. 1992).
See id. at 99.
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$100 and that B, her neighbor, values it at $200. If B buys the property, the
transaction will be efficient because it will involve a transfer of an asset
from a person who values it less to a person who values it more. Moreover,
A would not agree to sell the property and B would not agree to buy it unless
both were to determine the transaction as being subjectively worthwhile.6
Put another way, both A and B would consent to the transaction precisely
because it is efficient.
An important problem from the perspective of corporate law is that
a group of security holders, as opposed to a single individual, needs to
approve corporate transactions.7 Collective decision-making muddies the
concept of consent. Due to the divergence of opinions among the members of
the security holders group as to the value of corporate transactions, attaining
efficiency becomes problematic. Within the context of collective decisionmaking, therefore, efficiency must be identified on the basis of the "group
preference" regarding what would maximize the expected return for the group
as a whole.8 The group preference is the equivalent of the group’s consent.
Voting is most commonly accepted as the best method for extracting
the group preference from among the disparate and diverging subjective
opinions of the group of security holders. The majority view of the security
holders reflects the optimal choice for the group as a whole,9 providing
the best approximation of the choice that would be implemented if a single
individual, rather than a group, were making the decision.10 The presumed
correlation between the group preference and the majority view rests on a
statistical proposition: assuming each security holder is more likely to be

See Timothy Muris, Cost of Completion or Diminution in Market Value: The
Relevance of Subjective Value, 12 J. Legal Stud. 379 (1983).
7 Every investor group is party to a contract with the company in which it has invested.
Shareholders, for example, are party to a contract embodied in the company’s charter
or bylaws, while bondholders are party to a loan contract embodied in the particular
issue’s trust indenture.
8 See Nitzan & Procaccia, supra note 2.
9 See Shmuel I. Nitzan & Jacob Paroush, Optimal Decision Rules in Uncertain
Dichotomous Choice Situations, 23 Int’l Econ. Rev. 289 (1982). Another approach
to the voting process is that majority rule facilitates transactions that, although not
beneficial to all members of the group, represent a net gain. Ronald J. Gilson &
Bernard S. Black, The Law and Finance of Corporate Acquisitions 643 (2d ed.
1995). Under this view, majority rule is analogous to the Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency
standard, under which the overall welfare is increased even though a minority is
injured as a result. Id. at 644.
10 Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Sole Owner Standard for Takeover Policy, 17 J. Legal
Stud. 197 (1988).
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correct than mistaken, the choice made by the largest number of voters will
most probably be the "correct" one.11 Hence, it is certainly in the minority’s
interest, ex ante, that the majority view prevail.12
While the voting system is an acceptable mechanism for determining the
group preference, it only functions as an indicator of transaction efficiency
when every individual in the group "votes sincerely," namely, in accordance
with his or her genuine personal assessment of the transaction’s desirability
for the group.13 Whenever voters take into account how other members
of the group will vote ("strategic voting")14 or else vote according to their
assessment of the transaction’s value to them personally outside of the group
("conflict of interests voting"),15 the voting procedure ceases to reflect the
group preference. When a voter votes strategically, for example, the majority
position no longer enjoys a greater probability than the minority’s position
of being the "correct" choice. In other words, the statistical proposition
underlying the correlation between the majority view and the group preference
is no longer valid. This is true even if all of the individuals in the group
participate in the vote. Likewise, conflict of interests voting undermines
the voting system’s ability to ascertain the group preference by shifting the
focus away from the transaction’s value to the group as a whole towards
the voters’ personal stakes in the deal. Because the goal of corporate law

11 See Ronald J. Gilson & Reiner H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency,

70 Va. L. Rev. 549 (1984).
12 See Michael J. Taylor, Proof of a Theorem of Majority Rule, 14 Behav. Sci. 228

(1969) (behind a perfect veil of ignorance regarding proposals that will be put to a
vote and regarding the expected stance to be taken in the votes, the voter will prefer
simple majority rule).
Despite the subjective belief of those in the minority that their choice is "right,"
they will still recognize it as, statistically speaking, "wrong" (i.e., that majority rule
will prevent an error both in the immediate vote and, more generally, in the sum of
future ballots). This is true even though in certain cases, the minority will be proven
right ex post facto, just as A might sell an asset to B and later regret her decision.
Such a possibility is of no concern; in either case, the goal is to determine ex ante
whether a transaction is efficient at the moment of its performance. Richard A.
Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities and the Single Owner: One More Salute to Ronald
Coase, 36 J.L. & Econ. 553, 558 (1993).
13 Amartya Sen, Behavior and the Concept of Preference, in Rational Choice 60 (Jon
Elster ed., 1986).
14 See Zohar Goshen, Controlling Strategic Voting: Property Rule or Liability Rule?,
70 Cal. L. Rev. 743 (1997).
15 See Zohar Goshen, Voting and the Economics of Corporate Self-Dealing: Theory
Meets Reality, at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?cfid=447349&cftoken=
98858720&abstract_id=229273.
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is to facilitate efficient transactions, strategic and conflict of interests voting
raise serious legal issues, as explained below.
A. Strategic Voting
The voting system is susceptible to two kinds of strategic voting: natural
strategic voting and coercive strategic voting.16
1. Natural Strategic Voting: The Free-Rider and Holdout Problems
Natural strategic voting occurs "naturally," that is to say, without the
intervention of third parties. The mere convergence of a number of variables
forces voters to take account of the way in which other members of the
group will vote. This often occurs in the context of the free-rider and holdout
problems.
a. The Free-Rider Problem. The free-rider problem arises whenever a
transaction furthering the interests of a given voter can be performed despite
that same voter’s opposition to the transaction. This opposing voter can
enjoy the benefits of the transaction by free-riding on the efforts of other
voters who support and enable the transaction. The following is an example
in which the "vote" is reflected through the "action" of a shareholder.
Suppose that a corporate raider wishes to take control of a target company,
A, and that in order to complete the takeover, the raider must acquire 50% of
the existing shares. In order to induce the shareholders to tender, the raider
offers to buy shares at some premium above the trading price. Assuming that
the company’s market value on the day of the offer reflects its true value,
shareholders should be eager to tender for the premium offered. Suppose,
however, that some shareholders believe that the premium offered reflects
only a fraction of the expected increase in the value of the company under
the raider’s new management. Banking on the fact that their peers will

16 See, e.g., John C. Coffee & William A. Klein, Bondholder Coercion: The Problem of

Constrained Choice in Debt Tender Offers and Recapitalizations, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1207 (1991); Victor Brundey, Corporate Bondholders and Debtor Opportunism: In
Bad Times and Good, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1821 (1992); Note, Distress-Contingent
Convertible Bonds: A Proposed Solution to the Excess Debt Problem, 105 Harv. L.
Rev. 1857 (1991). In some instances, coercive voting tactics are implemented as
a response to the deficiencies inherent in the voting system (i.e., natural strategic
voting). See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97
Yale L.J. 232 (1987); Lewis S. Peterson, Who’s Being Greedy? A Theoretical and
Empirical Examination of Holdouts and Coercion in Debt Tender and Exchange
Offers, 103 Yale L.J. 505 (1993).
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tender the requisite 50%, they hold on to their stock, seeking to enjoy the
increased value that will be produced after the takeover has been completed.
Obviously, these shareholders will be taking a "free ride" on the tendering
shareholders who, in tendering for the smaller premium, will incur the cost
of transferring control. Moreover, this "free ride" will come at the expense
of the new controlling shareholders, who will incur additional expenses of
their own in bringing about new and better management. The most troubling
aspect, however, is the potential foiling of efficient transactions: if most
shareholders become "free-riders," not enough shares will be tendered and
a desirable takeover attempt will fail.17
b. The Holdout Problem. Like the free-rider problem, the holdout
problem illustrates the way in which natural strategic voting comes into
play. The holdout problem takes place whenever a transaction furthering
the interests of a given voter can be performed only with that voter’s
support for the transaction. The voter, however, opposes the desired
transaction, attempting to extract additional value from the deal. Suppose
that Corporation B is failing financially and that the management, in an
effort to ease the debt, asks for the bondholders’ consent to an interest rate
decrease. Because of the nature of the change, the unanimous consent of
all the bondholders is required.18 As a result of this unanimity requirement,
each bondholder knows that the success or failure of the company depends
upon her consent: with a lower interest rate, the company will be able to raise
additional capital; without it, the company will fail and go bankrupt. Despite
the fact that this decrease in the interest rate may be in the best interests of
all the bondholders, an individual bondholder may vote strategically against
the change, withholding her consent until she is paid a higher price for her
support. The holdout’s demand can be directed at the other party to the
transaction, requiring an increase in the price offered to all the members
of the group or just to the individual holdout, or else at the other members
of the holdout’s group, requiring uneven distribution of the proceeds of the
transaction. Unfortunately, however, if too many bondholders "hold out," the
restructuring will not occur and the company will go bankrupt.19 The most
troubling aspect of a strategic holdout is that like free-riding, it too can lead to
the failure of efficient transactions.
c. Free-Riders and Holdouts Compared. Though both free-riding and

17 See Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver Hart, Takeover Bids, the Free Rider Problem

and the Theory of the Corporation, 11 Bell J. Econ. 42, 43 (1980).
18 See Roe, supra note 16.
19 See, e.g., Coffee & Klein, supra note 16.
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holding out are examples of natural strategic voting, they have certain
characteristics that distinguish them from one another.20 In the holdout
situation, a party refuses to give her consent, knowing that ultimately she
will be better off even if the transaction is approved as is. She opposes the
transaction knowing from the outset that she will support it at a later stage for
a higher price. In stark contrast, the free-rider opposes a given transaction to
the end. Indeed, the benefit from free-riding—as opposed to holding out—is
that the transaction can go through without the free-rider’s consent, thereby
enabling her to benefit from the transaction while saving the cost of facilitating
it.
A second difference relates to the level of consent required. Holding out is
more common where a unanimous or near-unanimous vote is needed. This
is because as the level of the required consent approaches unanimity, each
individual vote becomes more important and each voter more powerful. At
the extreme end, when unanimity is required, each security holder has veto
power. Free-riding, on the other hand, is only possible in situations where a
transaction can succeed in spite of individual opposition. In other words, if
the free-rider were to believe that her vote could influence the outcome, she
would be unable to free-ride, because her vote would cause the transaction
to fail and she could not expect to profit by taking a free ride. Indeed, the
free-rider banks on the transaction’s success despite her opposition, looking
to reap profits by seeing her opposition through to the end.
To illustrate this distinction, consider again the example of Corporation
B. If we were to change the majority needed to approve the reorganization
plan from 100% to 50%, holdouts would decrease because each individual
voter would have less power to "block" the transaction. Moreover, freeriding would be impossible, because the majority’s decision would bind all
bondholders—including those in opposition. Suppose, however, that instead
of reducing the required majority, Corporation B asks its bondholders to
exchange their old bonds for new bonds (with a lower interest rate) and
that 50% of the bonds have to be exchanged in order for the restructuring
to succeed. In this instance, the holdout problem would diminish because
individual bondholders would have less power to frustrate the reorganization.
The free-rider problem, however, would dominate the scenario because even
if a majority of individual voters were to consent to the exchange, dissenting
bondholders would continue to be paid at the higher interest rate. Indeed,
the rational bondholder would prefer to hold on to her bonds, because after
the restructuring, the original bonds will pay a higher rate of interest than

20 See Lloyd Cohen, Holdouts and Free Riders, 20 J. Legal Stud. 351 (1991).
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the new bonds. Put another way, the rational bondholder would prefer to
take a free ride on those bondholders who exchange their bonds and who,
in doing so, pay the cost of keeping the company afloat.
Finally, whereas free-riding can take place only when several voters
are involved, a holdout is possible even when the consent of only one
individual is needed. A free-rider, after all, cannot free-ride on herself.
Indeed, the benefit of free-riding is rooted in the ability to take advantage
of the decisions of others. In contrast, the holdout party may withhold her
support in an attempt to cause the bidder to raise the offer, even if she is the
only one to whom the offer is made.21 Nonetheless, an important difference
still exists between individuals and groups in the holdout context. When the
holdout takes place in the framework of a transaction between individuals,
the holdout party knows that she alone will bear the risk of crossing the fine
line between tough negotiations and excessive demands that may result in
the loss of a beneficial transaction (even at the initially offered price). In a
transaction involving collective decision-making, on the other hand, since the
risk of losing the transaction due to her excessive demands is borne equally by
all members of the group, she is in fact externalizing an uncompensated risk
of losing the deal to the other members of the group. In this sense, the holdout
problem is more troubling when collective decision-making is involved.
2. Coerced Strategic Voting: The Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Coordination
Problem
Natural strategic voting poses a problem for market players in that it
disrupts the voting mechanism and causes efficient transactions to fail.
Accordingly, lawyers, investment bankers, and other third parties have
devised techniques to minimize the potential of its occurrence. Though these
parties sometimes aim to restore the integrity of the voting system, they
are more often seeking to distort the voting mechanism towards their own
ends.22 Whatever the motivation, though, the techniques they employ often
exacerbate—rather than diminish—the problem of strategic voting: voters
are forced to agree to transactions they find undesirable because they are
forced into a prisoner’s dilemma or face a coordination problem. The result is

21 It is important to stress that the phenomenon described here as a holdout relates to a

situation in which from the perspective of the individual holding out, the transaction
is desirable and her behavior is no more than an attempt to make the transaction even
more desirable for her. It is impossible to actually determine whether opposition to
a particular transaction developed because the offering price was too low to begin
with or for the purpose of forcing a more desirable transaction.
22 See supra note 16.
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coercive strategic voting, in which voters are entrapped in purposely-crafted
dilemmas.
In the corporate context, a number of coercive voting tactics, which
undermine security holders’ ability to negotiate as a group, are employed.
These tactics typically include three elements. First, they structure the vote
so that every individual can act independently of the group.23 This is usually
accomplished by allowing "voting by action" or by instituting an indirect
voting system in which the majority position does not bind the entire group
and uniformity of action is not required. Second, coercive strategic tactics
increase the dependency of expected profits on the actions of other group
members. For example, a transaction may be conditioned on the support of
a given percentage of voters, putting opposing voters in the minority after
the transaction takes place. Finally, coercive voting techniques tend to punish
security holders who oppose transactions by preventing them from profiting
as free-riders or by putting them in a worse position than they would have
been had they consented to the transaction in the first place. These tactics
are the building blocks for entrapping voters in a prisoner’s dilemma or a
coordination problem.
a. The Prisoner’s Dilemma. The prisoner’s dilemma represents a situation
in which a third party is able to manipulate and take advantage of an
individual’s options. Game theory describes the prisoner’s dilemma as
follows. Two individuals—Prisoner 1 and Prisoner 2—rob a bank and are
arrested by the police. At the time of their arrest, they are found in possession
of an unlicensed firearm. Though the police know that both committed the
robbery, they have no proof to support the charge at trial. They therefore
separate the two and offer each the following deal: If both confess, the district
attorney will agree to a five-year sentence (half the maximum sentence for
the crime) for each. If neither confesses, they will both serve one year for
unlawful possession of a firearm. Finally, if one confesses and the other
does not, the partner who confesses will be given the opportunity to turn
state witness and avoid imprisonment altogether, while the other partner
will receive the maximum ten-year sentence.24
Clearly, each prisoner has one dominant strategy: confess to participation
in the robbery. This strategy is not dependent on the other prisoner’s actions.
Consider the situation from the perspective of Prisoner 2. If Prisoner 1 does

23 In most cases, the offer is to exchange one security for another. The exchange offer,

just as the sale of a security, is an activity we are accustomed to viewing as a
derivative of ownership of a security, which every voter is free to do individually.
24 See R. Duncan Luce & Howard Raiffa, Games and Decisions 95 (1957).
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not confess, Prisoner 2 will be better off admitting his participation in the
robbery. Prisoner 2, after all, can avoid serving any jail time by turning
state witness. Even the charge of possession of an unlicensed firearm will
be dropped. Moreover, if Prisoner 1 confesses, Prisoner 2 will still be better
off confessing, because by admitting to her participation in the crime, she
will be given a lighter sentence: five years in jail rather than the maximum
ten-year term. Prisoner 1 will be faced with the same choices as Prisoner 2,
so she, too, will choose to confess. Therefore, the outcome of this prisoner’s
dilemma will always be that both prisoners confess and both are sentenced
to five years in jail. However, had they both denied participation, they both
would have been sentenced to only one year in prison. That is to say, because
the two prisoners share the same dominant strategy, they together attain an
inferior equilibrium that is to their mutual detriment.
Significantly, the prisoner’s dilemma is not a coordination problem, but,
rather, a conflict of interests problem. In other words, even if the prisoners
could meet before the interrogation to determine a plan of action, they
would not be able to escape the dilemma. Instead, the dilemma would
simply play itself out at another level.25 To illustrate: If Prisoner 2 were
certain that Prisoner 1 would stand by her word and deny her participation in
the robbery, she would still have an incentive to confess to the police. After all,
though her defection would result in Prisoner 1 being sentenced to a ten-year
prison term, it would also allow her to turn state witness and avoid serving any
jail time. Moreover, if Prisoner 2 were not sure that Prisoner 1 would keep her
end of the deal, she would still be better off confessing to the police. After all,
if Prisoner 1 were to cave-in to the pressure or to follow her own interests and
take advantage of the deal herself, Prisoner 2 would need to confess in order
to avoid the maximum ten-year sentence. In other words, due to the conflict
of interests and the incentives influencing each prisoner, both prisoners will
choose to defect and confess in spite of their coordinated positions.
Vote buying can be considered an example of the prisoner’s dilemma in
the corporate context.26 When someone purchases a share, she also purchases
a bundle of rights including the right to dividends, the right to vote, and a right
to a share of the company’s remaining assets upon dissolution. Significantly,
the right to vote also includes the right to amend the entire bundle of rights
attached to each share or to affect that nexus of rights by voting on policies
related to the company’s business or to shareholder rights. Assuming that the
right to vote is attached to the other rights, the shareholder will utilize her

25 See id. at 96-97.
26 For a discussion on vote buying, see Goshen, supra note 14.
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vote in a way that preserves or increases the value of the bundle as a whole.
However, if the shareholder sells the right to vote, the purchaser will not
exercise that right under the same set of incentives. This creates a substantial
risk that the shareholder who sold the right to vote will be worse off, as the
purchaser may now make decisions that will dilute the value of the remaining
rights in the seller’s share.27
Because vote buying creates a gap between those who own shares and
those who merely own the right to vote, it also creates a prisoner’s dilemma.
An individual shareholder has incentive to sell her right to vote.28 As an
individual small shareholder, she knows her vote is not pivotal and is thus
worthless. In any event, the fate of the voting will be determined by the other
voters in her group. Thus, any positive price for the vote is a good deal for
the individual voter. Indeed, as a member of a large group, the individual
shareholder banks on the fact that the majority will protect her interests by
protecting their own and refusing to sell their votes. If this happens, the
purchaser of her vote will have little power to effect detrimental change,
while she will get a positive price for the vote in any case. Moreover, because
making the right decision in a corporate vote involves high information costs,
the profit the shareholder can hope to earn by selling her right to vote is often
greater than any profit she could garner by retaining it. Of course, if every
shareholder decides to sell his or her right to vote, the situation changes.
More specifically, the same individual small shareholder will find herself
facing a prisoner’s dilemma. If she retains her right to vote, she will find
herself at a double loss. First, her shares will be diluted because the purchaser
will now have enough power to bring about significant corporate change.
Second, she will lose the premium the purchaser offered in exchange for her
vote. Therefore, whatever the other shareholders do, she is always better off
selling her vote.29 As a prisoner’s dilemma situation, vote buying cannot be
solved through coordination, as each voter is in a conflict of interests vis-à-vis

27 See, e.g., Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. &

Econ. 395, 410 (1983).
28 See Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Law 390 (1986).
29 To understand this problem more clearly, imagine that Corporation Z’s shares are

selling at $10 each and that the price offered for the voting rights is $2 per share.
Imagine further that if all of the shareholders sell their voting rights, the value of
the shares will decrease to $7 apiece due to the dilution created by the votes’ buyer.
Under this scenario, each shareholder will seek to sell her voting rights. After all,
if she sells and the others do not, she will gain the $2 premium without suffering
any dilution. Conversely, if the other shareholders sell and she does not, she will
be doubly worse off. She will have received no premium, and her shares will be
diluted from $10 to $7 apiece.

11

12

Theoretical Inquiries in Law

other voters. That is to say, if a voter is certain that other voters will not sell
their votes, she has an even greater incentive to sell her own. After all, she
knows for a fact that she will be able to secure a premium without suffering
any dilution. Clearly, however, if all the voters think this way, dilution will
occur.
b. The Coordination Problem. The coordination problem represents a
situation in which all the voters have identical interests but are unable to
agree on their preferred alternative because they are unable to coordinate
their positions. To illustrate, suppose that the prisoners in the prisoner’s
dilemma scenario described above are offered the following deal: If neither
confesses, both will be set free. If both confess, both will be sentenced to five
years in jail. If one confesses and the other does not, the one who cooperates
will be sentenced to one year in jail, while the other will be sentenced to
ten years. In this situation, each prisoner’s optimal strategy depends on the
other’s actions. Consider the situation from the perspective of Prisoner 2.
If Prisoner 1 denies participation in the robbery, Prisoner 2 will be better
off denying participation as well. After all, if neither confesses, neither will
go to jail. Similarly, if Prisoner 1 confesses, Prisoner 2 should confess as
well so that she gets a five-year sentence rather than the maximum ten.
Obviously, if both prisoners act rationally and with perfect information,
they will both deny the charges and be set free. The problem, however,
is that the prisoners do not have perfect information about the expected
benefits or about the other prisoner (e.g., her abilities, her rationality, and
the information in her possession as to the expected benefits). Both will,
therefore, most surely confess. Put another way, because of their inability to
coordinate their positions, the prisoners will make decisions that are to their
mutual detriment.
This point can be clarified by considering what would happen if the
prisoners were allowed to meet and coordinate their positions. Assume that
the prisoners meet and agree to deny participation in the robbery. If Prisoner
2 believes that Prisoner 1 will abide by their agreement, she will certainly
abide by it too. Moreover, in this instance, Prisoner 2 has no reason to fear
that Prisoner 1 will defect. Prisoner 1, after all, will only worsen her plight
by defecting. In other words, under the coordination problem scenario,
self-interest reinforces—rather than undermines—the agreement between
the prisoners. Significantly, if the prisoners are repeat offenders, they can
coordinate their positions even without meeting. In other words, over time,
they will be able to coordinate their actions by signaling one another.30

30 Some studies have found that in games repeated many times where the players do

not know when the game will end, coordination can exist even if the players are
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The issue of "exit consent" illustrates how the coordination problem
operates in the context of corporate law. Exit consent is implicated in tender
offers for bonds that carry protective covenants. As a general rule, protective
covenants are amended either by a regular majority or by a super majority.
However, because stripping a bond of its covenants increases its risk and
reduces its value, bondholders are almost always opposed to this kind of
amendment in the absence of proper compensation. That said, in some
instances, third parties can force bondholders to agree to revoking protective
covenants, even without any compensation, by making a tender offer that
places the bondholders in a coordination problem. Under the terms of this
kind of an offer, the bondholder must agree to vote to amend the protective
covenants before tendering her bonds for the price offered. In other words,
in order to "exit," the bondholder must "consent" to revoke the covenants.
Because each bondholder does not know how the other bondholders will
respond to the offer, all of the bondholders will tender and consent to the
revocation—even if they value the bond above the premium offered. After
all, if a bondholder tenders, she gets a premium above the market value.
More important, if she does not tender but the other bondholders do, her
bonds will be stripped of their protective covenants and become devalued.
Assuming that all bondholders value their bonds above the offered premium,
there will be no conflict of interests among the members of the group (i.e.,
no prisoner’s dilemma). Thus, if allowed to coordinate, the bondholders
will refrain from tendering their bonds and avoid stripping them of their
covenants. However, being in a coordination problem and not knowing how
the other bondholders will behave, a bondholder is forced to agree to a
sub-optimal offer.31
In sum, strategic voting, whether natural or coercive, frustrates the voting
mechanism’s ability to serve as an efficient collective decision-making
process. The result of a vote tainted by strategic voting is that it does not

placed in the prisoners’ dilemma. See Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation
(1984).
31 Significantly, though market forces mitigate the effects of coercion by creating
competition among bidders, they cannot eliminate it entirely. Indeed, where there
are several bids, competition among bidders will drive the tender price up, pushing
the transaction closer to efficiency. Market forces could, however, hit the wall for
several reasons: First, competition is not always possible. In some instances, for
example, the group is prohibited from transacting with anybody other than those
who are party to the security contract. Second, even when competition is viable, it
does not always occur. Not every tender offer, for example, is met with a competing
bid. Finally, there is not always a sufficient number of competitors. Indeed, even the
sole owner who has several competing offers is not always able to close a deal.
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reflect the group preference and the majority view does not represent the
"correct" choice for the group.
B. Conflicts of Interests
Like strategic voting, conflict of interests voting undermines the voting
mechanism’s ability to ascertain whether or not a transaction is efficient.32
A conflict of interests arises when some members of the voting group have
personal interests that run counter to their interests as members of the group.33
Conflict of interests voting distorts the voting mechanism by shifting the
focus away from what is best for the group as a whole to what is best for each
individual member. Consequently, conflict of interests voting undermines the
voting mechanism’s ability to determine the group preference.34
Conflict of interests voting arises in several different contexts in corporate
law.35 The "interested shareholder" scenario is one of the most common
conflict of interests fact patterns. Suppose that Corporation X is considering a
proposal to acquire Corporation Y. In the normal course of events, there will
be differences of opinion among the shareholders as to whether or not the deal
is worthwhile for the group as a whole. Notwithstanding these differences of
opinion, if the voting mechanism is operating properly and everybody votes
sincerely, the majority opinion will reflect the group preference. Suppose,
however, that A, a controlling shareholder in Corporation X, is also the
sole owner of Corporation Y. Shareholder A most assuredly will not view
the results of the vote exclusively from the perspective of Corporation X.

32 For a detailed discussion of conflict of interests problems, see Goshen, supra note

15.
33 The conflict of interests problem is only one manifestation of the fundamental

"agency problem" that pervades corporate law. See Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976); William L. Cary & Melvin A. Eisenberg,
Cases and Materials on Corporations 647-809 (7th ed., unabr. 1995).
34 See Arrow, supra note 1; Duncan Black, The Theory of Committees and Elections
(1958).
35 See, e.g., Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422 (Del. 1997); Kahn v. Lynch
Communication Sys., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994); Wiegand v. Berry Petroleum Co.,
1991 Del. Ch. Lexis 37; Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929 (Del. 1985);
Cookies Food Prods. v. Lakes Warehouse, 430 N.W.2d 447 (Iowa 1988); Levien v.
Sinclair Oil Corp., 261 A.2d 911 (Del. Ch. 1969); David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill
Int’l Inc., 249 A.2d 427 (Del. Ch. 1968); Warshaw v. Calhoun, 221 A.2d 487 (Del.
1966); Ripley v. Int’l Ry. of Cent. America, 8 N.Y.2d 430, 209 N.Y.S.2d 289 (1960);
Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107 (Del. 1952); Gottlieb v. Heyden
Chem. Corp., 91 A.2d 57 (Del. 1952).
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Indeed, unlike the ordinary shareholder, A may actually earn a net profit
if Corporation X makes a "mistake" and pays too much. Put another way,
since A is involved in both sides of the transaction and playing two opposing
roles, she may actually profit at the expense of the group’s minority.
When a voter stands on both sides of a transaction, the conflict of interests
problem is especially apparent, but this problem also can arise in situations
that appear far more innocent. Consider the following example: A group of
voters are considering whether or not to amend the corporation’s articles of
association so as to provide that the holder of each share is entitled to ten
votes instead of one. Suppose further that accompanying this amendment
is a proviso that the additional nine votes shall be forfeited if the share is
sold and that only continuous possession for a three-year period will restore
the additional voting power.36 On the surface, these changes apply equally
to all of the shareholders. In practice, however, these changes may create
two classes of shareholders, preserving or even increasing the advantage the
controlling shareholders have over the minority: controlling shareholders,
after all, are interested in long-term holdings, while minority shareholders
tend to trade their shares much more frequently. The result will be that a
controlling shareholder could have complete corporate control — including
the ability to prevent a takeover—even though she controls less than 50% of
the available capital.37
Conflict of interests problems can also arise in the context of the "interested
director." Suppose, for example, that a corporation is considering whether
or not to buy an asset. Ordinarily, the board of directors will consider the
value of the asset to the corporation and the offering price. The board’s
vote for or against the acquisition will reflect the value of the deal to the
corporation as a whole. Suppose, however, that one of the directors is the
owner of the asset. If the deal goes through, is it because it is efficient or
because the director influenced the vote in her favor? Clearly, there is a
good chance that the transaction will benefit the director, while harming the
corporation. Indeed, the risk that the corporation will be harmed increases
relative to the number of shares the director holds in the corporation. This

36 See Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1996).
37 Suppose a controlling owner holds 30 of 100 shares and the rest of the shares are

widely distributed. Before the change, the public’s voting power is 70%, whereas
afterwards, assuming that the public’s shares are actively traded, its voting power
will sink to 19% (70 votes out of 370) and the controlling owner will have 81%
of the vote. In this way, the company may become immune to a potential takeover,
without additional investment on the part of the controlling owner.
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is because the director—acting as shareholder—also has the power to elect
or remove other corporate officers at a later date.
When the director actually votes on a deal that affects her personally, the
conflict of interests is as clear as it is with the interested shareholder. A more
complicated conflict of interests problem is presented by positional conflicts
of interests. A positional conflict of interests arises when a director acts
to preserve her own position in the company, while her self-serving action
could be construed as promoting a different legitimate motive. For instance,
when resisting a takeover, directors could be guarding their own positions
or protecting the corporation against exploitation or looting. Indeed, it is
hard to ascertain which motive is the true one standing behind the action.
In sum, conflict of interests voting distorts the voting mechanism’s ability
to reflect group preference, as the majority view no longer represents the
"correct" choice for the group.
Significantly, not every conflict of interests is necessarily inefficient, and
in certain situations, a transaction with an interested shareholder may be
the best option available to the group. This could be so, for instance, where
the corporation seeks a loan from one of its controlling owners. Because
the rate of interest is, inter alia, a function of the amount of information
the lender has regarding the corporation’s financial stability, an insider will
be in a better position to offer a cheaper loan. After all, presenting an
accurate portrait of the corporation to an outsider might be difficult, whereas
a shareholder/lender has better access to information and better knowledge
as to its reliability. Moreover, in some situations, an important transaction
may be impossible without self-dealing.38 Similarly, a self-dealer may have
a competitive edge in the market or even an advantage stemming from her
proximity to the group, which ensures that a deal with her is in the group’s
best interests. This is the reason that a screening system should be adopted to
promote efficient transactions and frustrate inefficient ones, rather than a per
se prohibition on self-dealing.39

38 See, e.g., Case v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 204 N.E.2d 643 (N.Y. 1965) (consolidation of

taxes between the parent company, which suffered losses, and its subsidiary, which
registered profits, created a tax saving).
39 See Goshen, supra note 15, infra Part III.A.
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II. STRATEGIC AND CONFLICT OF INTERESTS VOTING:
FRATERNAL TWINS
Strategic voting and conflict of interests voting have more than a little in
common; the same set of facts may often be seen as a conflict of interests and
a strategic voting problem. Reconsider the example in which one bondholder
votes strategically against an interest rate decrease proposed by the company.
Though she knows that the proposal merits her support, she votes against it
anyway. But the bondholder’s behavior is no more strategic voting than it is
conflict of interests voting. The bondholder, after all, is motivated by a desire
to secure a greater percentage of the profit for herself. In short, her interest
as a bondholder in what is best for the company conflicts with her interest
in making money from the deal personally. Indeed, strategic voting and
conflict of interests voting coincide in the sense that acting "strategically"
often means being in a conflict of interests.
Beyond the descriptive similarity of strategic voting as conflict of interests
voting, there is a practical coincidence between the two. Many events in
corporate law present both aspects simultaneously. This is illustrated by the
facts of two cases, Katz v. Oak Industries40 and Williams v. Geier.41
At issue in Katz was a tender offer for bonds with protective covenants.
Under the terms of the proposed deal, the price offered to the bondholders
was above the market price (but lower than par). Moreover, the deal was
predicated on two conditions. First, a majority of the preferred bondholders
and at least two-thirds of the subordinate bondholders had to consent to the
deal. Second, all of the bondholders who accepted the tender offer were
required to vote to rescind the protective covenants.
The structure of the Katz deal as an exit consent presented the threat that
the bondholders would vote strategically.42 If each bondholder were to value
the bonds at their market price, then the success of the tender offer would not
be a sign of a distorted vote. However, even under the assumption that all the
bondholders value the bonds at a higher price, e.g., at par, the coordination
problem would still lead to the success of the tender offer. Although in the latter
case, the clear preference of every bondholder would be to receive par value
for her bonds, because the individual bondholder does not know how the other
bondholders will vote, she is nonetheless forced into a dilemma. If she tenders

40 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986).
41 671 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1996).
42 For further discussion, see Goshen, supra note 14, at 787.
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her bonds, she will receive a premium above market value. More important, if
she does not tender but a sufficient number of the other bondholders do, she will
be left with bonds stripped of their protective covenants. Consequently, her
bonds will be worth less than they were before. Thus, due to the coordination
problem the bondholder is forced to accept the tender offer in order to avoid a
loss. This situation is a clear instance of strategic voting.
In addition to posing a strategic voting problem, however, the exit consent
offer also poses a conflict of interests problem. There is no doubt that a
conflict of interests problem arises if the corporation (the debtor) buys
back its bonds and later on tries to vote with them to strip them of their
protective covenants. Indeed, in Katz, there was a provision in Oak’s trust
indenture clearly prohibiting such a vote by the corporation. The "exit
consent," therefore, simply circumvents the prohibition on a conflicted vote
by the corporation. After all, the bondholders vote to rescind the bonds’
protections in order to fulfill a condition of the tender offer. By the time
they cast this vote, however, they have already decided to sell their bonds
to the corporation (the offeror), and they do not bear the consequences
of their damaging vote. On the other hand, once the corporation receives
the bonds, it cannot vote due to the contractual prohibition on conflict of
interests voting by the corporation. Thus, for all practical purposes, the
exiting bondholders are acting as mere agents of the buyer (the corporation).
They are voting "just a second" before they tender the bonds—a tender
that will trigger the prohibition on the corporation’s conflicted vote. Since
it is in the buyer’s interest to rescind the protective covenants, the vote for
rescission is essentially a conflict of interests vote.
Williams v. Geier provides another illustration of the practical link between
strategic and conflict of interests voting.43 At issue in Geier was a plan to
amend the company’s bylaws so that the bearer of each of its shares would
be entitled to ten votes instead of one. Under the terms of the amendment,
the additional votes would be forfeited if the share were sold, though
continuous possession for a three-year period would eventually restore the
additional voting power. In order for the amendment to pass, a majority
of the shareholders had to approve it. In addition, due to the fact that the
suggested change would result in dual-class shares ("10-votes shares" and
"1-vote shares"), the vote to change the bylaws was linked to another issue,
namely, delisting. According to the stock exchange rules, a reorganization
resulting in dual-class shares must be approved by a two-thirds vote or the
stock will be delisted. Therefore, if only a simple majority were to approve

43 671 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1996).
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the amendment, the shares would automatically be delisted. Nonetheless,
the controlling shareholder informed all other shareholders that he would
vote for the amendment. It was clear, therefore, that although the controlling
shareholder had the required majority to assure the amendment of the
bylaws, he could not vote a sufficient number of shares to prevent delisting.
Consequently, other shareholders supported the change, and the two-thirds
majority required to avoid delisting was achieved.
The Geier plan can be seen from both strategic voting and conflict
of interests perspectives. From the vantage point of average short-term
shareholders, the amendment was undesirable. After all, it would put them
in the minority, denying them voting power that might otherwise allow
them to seize a corporate control premium, without any compensation.
Despite their preference, however, the structure of the proposal and, more
specifically, the link between the amendment and delisting would force them
to vote for the amendment. In other words, they would strategically vote in
favor of the amendment in order to avoid having the amendment pass by a
narrow—rather than two-thirds—majority.
At the same time, Geier presents a clear conflict of interests problem. The
controlling shareholder who votes on the deal has an interest in long-term
holdings. The passage of the amendment would result in his complete
control of the company, without any corresponding capital investment or
compensation to the public shareholders. Moreover, it is precisely because his
tainted vote would assure the change to the bylaws that other shareholders
would be pressured to support the decision in order to avoid delisting.
Therefore, even if the controlling shareholder’s vote were not to be counted
(as opposed to actually voted) and a "majority of the minority" vote were
achieved, there would still be a distorted vote. This is because counting the
number of disinterested supporters after the controlling owner votes only
reflects the minority’s attempt to avoid delisting, not its view regarding the
desirability of the change in the bylaws. In order to achieve a sincere vote,
the controlling owner would have to refrain from voting on both issues
or the minority shareholders would have to be informed ex ante that the
majority votes will not be counted.
In sum, strategic voting can, theoretically, be viewed as conflict of interests
voting. More importantly, in practice, aspects of both problems are present
in many fact patterns in corporate law.
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III. THE NATURE OF THE SOLUTIONS:
PROPERTY AND LIABILITY RULES
The solutions to strategic and conflict of interests voting can be characterized
in one of two ways: either as a property rule or as a liability rule.44 A property
rule is an ex ante approach to strategic voting and conflict of interests voting,
according to which a deal can only be executed with the consent of
all the parties involved.45 A liability rule, on the other hand, is an ex post
approach under which the transfer or change of an entitlement can be
forced upon the owner by anyone willing to pay the objective value of
the entitlement as determined by the courts.46 To illustrate: Under a liability
rule, a factory would be permitted to pollute the air so long as the factory
owners pay damages to the pollutee. Such a rule would enable the factory
owners to compel the factory’s neighbors to sell their preference for clean air
in exchange for the objectively determined compensation. A property rule,
on the other hand, precludes the carrying out of any transaction to which
the owner has not consented. Thus, a rule establishing property protection of
clean air for the factory’s neighbors would enable injured residents to receive
a court injunction to stop the pollution. Consequently, the factory would have
to buy its neighbors’ rights to clean air for a price reflecting their subjective
valuation of clean air.
There are two key elements that underlie the property rule-liability rule
distinction. The first relates to the method of valuation. Under a property rule,
subjective valuation is determinative. All of the parties to the deal determine
ex ante whether they find the deal to be subjectively worthwhile. In contrast,
under a liability rule, objective valuation is the standard. The deal may go
through over the objection of some of the parties. At a later stage, however,
the court will step in and determine the value of the transaction based on an
objective evaluation, compensating those who were in opposition.
A second distinction lies in the division of the surplus. A voluntary
transaction generates a surplus, because each of the two parties attaches a
different value to the deal. Under a property rule, each party can negotiate
freely and attempt to secure a larger share of the surplus for herself. Under
a liability rule, however, one party is forced into a transaction and does not
negotiate for the surplus at all. Since any division of the surplus reflects
an efficient transaction and thus would be determined as objectively fair ex

44 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 3.
45 See id. at 1092.
46 See id.
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post, the party forcing the transaction will most likely secure the larger part
of the surplus.
The choice between the rules is based on the balance between negotiation
costs attendant upon a property rule and adjudication costs attendant upon a
liability rule. In short, negotiation costs will involve such costs as sending
proxies, holding the vote, contending with holdouts, and a reduced number
of efficient transactions; adjudication costs will include litigation and time
costs, receipt and evaluation of expert valuations, and judgment errors.
These costs, in turn, will depend on the specifics of the conditions of the
economy and the legal system in the given country.47 Therefore, the question
whether one rule is preferable to the other or the two are equally effective will
be determined by the realities of the given country. Below, I suggest some
guidelines for choosing between a property rule and a liability rule to address
strategic voting and conflict of interests voting.
A. Strategic Voting
Some of corporate law’s solutions to strategic voting can be characterized as
property-rule protections and others as liability-rule protections. Consider
restrictions on coercive voting.48 These restrictions allow security holders to
arrive at the group preference by forcing people who wish to transact with
the group to acquire its consent. These restrictions afford the security holders
property-rule type protection: transactions are invalid ex ante if the rights
of the security holders are not protected up front. Moreover, the valuation
here is subjective. Since the transaction is voluntary, the security holders
determine whether or not the deal is worthwhile. Likewise, because the
security holders have the power to thwart the transaction, they can negotiate
for a greater portion of the surplus. In all senses, then, restrictions on
coercive voting offer property-rule protection.
In stark contrast, whenever coercive voting is allowed,49 liability-rule
protection is—or at least should be—afforded. With coercive voting, the

47 See, e.g., Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self Enforcing Model of Corporate

Law, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1911 (1996) (discussing the situation in Russia); Goshen,
supra note 15.
48 For such a proposal in the context of hostile takeovers, see Lucian Bebchuk, Toward
Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 Harv. L. Rev.
1695 (1985).
49 For such a proposal in the context of hostile takeovers, see Frank Easterbrook &
Daniel Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to a
Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161 (1981).
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group of voters is unable to present its true preference in the vote, since it
is forced to consent. Practically, therefore, the deal is not a consensual one.
As there is no need for true consent ex ante, security holders should have
the right to ask the court to determine the value of the transaction ex post.
In other words, since the security holders are forced to accept the deal,
they should have the right to objective valuation. Because the standard
is objective and the valuation is conducted after the transaction has been
completed, the minority holders have very weak bargaining power and thus,
ex ante, will receive a small portion of the surplus. For these reasons,
allowing coercive voting results in a legal regime that provides liability-rule
protection. In practice, however, courts have not provided for the right to
ask for ex post valuation.50 Any offer above market price is considered fair in
the context of strategic voting.
B. Conflict of Interests Voting
The characterization of the solutions to the conflict of interests problem as
either a property rule or liability rule is based on both the type of valuation
that each rule applies and the ramifications of each rule’s distributive effect.
Contrast in this respect the "fairness"51 and the "majority of the minority"52
solutions. The fairness test assumes that the majority can force a transaction
upon the minority, provided that the majority ensures a fair price that can be
verified ex post. Put another way, the fairness rule establishes a regime of
involuntary transactions and thus replaces the subjective valuations of the
contending security holders with an objective measure of valuation. For this
reason, it is a liability rule.
The "majority of the minority" test, on the other hand, prevents the
self-dealer from voting, thereby leaving the decision whether to accept the
transaction in the hands of the disinterested minority. The group (this time
represented by the disinterested minority) is free to accept or reject the
deal based on its subjective valuation. This rule, in short, provides ex ante
protection to the security holders and is thus property-rule protection.
The "fairness test" and the "majority of the minority" rule likewise differ
in terms of how they affect the division of the surplus. Under the fairness
test, the surplus is divided in the majority’s favor. So long as the price

50 See Goshen, supra note 14.
51 See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
52 This is, for instance, the rule in Canada; see Ronald J. Daniels & Jeffrey G.

Macintosh, Toward a Distinctive Canadian Corporate Law, 29 Osgoode Hall L.J.
863, 929 (1991).
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offered by the majority is within the range of efficient prices—a price that
could be determined in a transaction between a willing buyer and a willing
seller—the transaction will be approved by the court.53 Thus, the majority can
give a low but efficient price, taking most of the surplus for itself. In contrast,
the "majority of the minority" rule favors the minority in the division of the
surplus: since the minority wields a great deal of negotiating power ex ante,
it can secure a greater portion of the surplus for itself. Indeed, if it is not
satisfied with its part of the surplus, the minority can thwart the transaction
entirely by voting against it.54
As stated above, in both types of insincere voting, the superiority (or
neutrality) of one rule over the other depends on the amount of negotiation
costs attendant upon a property rule relative to the adjudication costs
attendant upon a liability rule. The preference of one rule over the other
thus is a function of the realities in the given country.

SUMMARY
Voting lies at the center of collective decision-making in corporate law.
While scholars have identified various problems with the voting mechanism,
insincere voting—in the forms of strategic voting and conflict of interests
voting—is perhaps the most fundamental. As shown in this article, insincere
voting distorts the voting mechanism at its core, undermining its ability to
determine transaction efficiency. As further demonstrated, strategic voting
and conflict of interests problems frequently coincide with one another:
voting strategically often means being in conflict, and many fact patterns
pose aspects of both problems. Although the two problems have seemingly
different solutions, these solutions are essentially similar in nature: all
solutions to insincere voting are variations on two basic rules, namely,
property and liability rules.

53 See, e.g., Revised Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.61 note on fair transactions (1989) ("It

has long been settled that a ‘fair’ price is any price in that broad range which an
unrelated party might have been willing to pay or willing to accept, as the case may
be, for the property, following a normal arm’s-length business negotiation, in the
light of knowledge that would have been reasonably acquired in the course of such
negotiations, any result within that range being ‘fair’... .").
54 See Susan Rose-Ackerman, I’d Rather Be Liable Than You: A Note on Property
Rules and Liability Rules, 6 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 225 (1986); David D. Haddock et
al., Property Rights in Assets and Resistance to Tender Offers, 73 Va. L. Rev. 701,
707 (1987).

